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Is the European Legislator
after Lisbon a real Legislature?
Wim Voermans::-
In his wonderful book Colossus Niall Ferguson1 tries to fathom the char-
acter of the European Union. What is it? A proto-federation that will vie
with the United States in due course or a megalomaniacal and hopelessly
divided us protectorate, which is apparently unable to unite itself and for
that reason - but also due to a lack of military ambition - does not succeed
in creating the institutional conditions necessary for growing into an eco-
nomic superpower? I will not give away the answer to his original question
here; anyone can read Chapter 7 - "Impire": Europe between Brussels and
Byzantium - of that book for themselves. What is interesting in this con-
text is that Ferguson regards the existence of a European legislature as an
important indication and hallmark of the quasi-federal character of the
European Union. In his eyes, such institutions are decisive for economic
stability and, in due course, economic superpower. In his words:
"(... ) the EU already has a quasi-federal character. This is most obvious in the
legal sphere. EU legislation now accounts for around half of all new legislation
in Europe."2
,;. Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law, Leiden University. Director of E.M. Meijers Institute for
Legal Research.
This contribution was written in the context of the Trias Europea programme, which is part of the Meijers research
programme entitled "Securing the Rule of Law in a World of Multi-Level Jurisdictions". A more or less similar
Dutch version of this article was published in December 2008 in R.A.J. van Gestel & J. van Schooten (Eds.) (2008),
Europa en de toekomst van de nationale wetgever (Europe and the Future of the National Legislator). Nijmegen:
Wolf Legal Publishers, pp. 65-89.
1 Niall Ferguson (2004), Colossus. Penguin Press; New York.
2 Ferguson (2004), pp. 234-235.
3 Ferguson (2004), pp. 254. By now,
four years after Ferguson wrote this,
there is no longer any - constitution-
ally enshrined - flag or anthem, but
this does not detract anything from
his argument.
4 Treaty of Lisbon amending the
Treaty on the European Union and
the Treaty establishing the European
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13
December 2007, OJ 20071C 306/01.
5 This is the new name of the former
EC Treaty.
6 Tom Eijsbouts (2003), "De Dage-
raad van een wetgever" (The Dawn
of a Legislator), Regelmaat, pp. 207-
221.
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"Europe's, in short, is a curious kind of union, a confederation that fantasize§;
about being a federation without ever quite becoming one. It has an executive,
a legislature, an upper house, a supreme court, a central bank, a common cur--
rency, a flag and an anthem. But it has only a tiny common budget and the barest
bones of a common army."3
But is the legislator of the European Union in fact a real legislature?'
This question is interesting given the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon+~'
creates some order out of the chaos of legislative procedures and legis- i
lative instruments from the EC and EU treaties. It creates a uniform!
"ordinary legislative procedure" (Article 294 of the Treaty on the Func...
tioning of the European Union,s hereinafter referred to as "the TFEU")
and a well-organized system of legal acts, which comprise legislative acts·
and non-legislative acts. The treaty even provides for a uniform frame-
work for delegation.
Like those made by the earlier constitutional treaty, the amendments to
the legislative procedure introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon have received
hardly any attention in the run-up to approval of the treaty in the Nether-
lands, even though these are quite substantial. The amendments received
the same lukewarm attention in other EU Member States, we deduce from
the reports of the approval proceedings in these countries.
The amendments deserved more notice, because they establish a Euro-
pean legislature and change the character and nature of the former legis-
lative procedures. According to the uniform
legislative procedure in the TFEU, the European
Parliament will be a genuine co-legislator in
nearly all cases in the future, and it will also
have a much tighter grip on implementation
legislation enacted on the European Commis-
sion's initiative. As a result of this parliamentary
involvement and the check that can be carried
out on delegated legislation, the European legis-
lator more than ever resembles most legislators
in the Member States. According to Tom
Eijsbouts, we are at the"dawn of a legislator"
(read: a real legislature) for this reason. 6 But is this really so? Can we
really put the European legislator, i.e. the collaboration of the European
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament
according to the ordinary legislative procedure, on a par with legislatures
in the Member States? The first question we have to answer is: what is
actually a real legislator ?
2. WHAT IS A LEGISLATURE, A LEGISLATOR?
What requirements must be satisfied before we can rightfully speak of
a legislature? Contrary to what one might expect, the literature does not
provide a quick answer to this? Yes, you can read quite a bit about ques-
tions such as the bodies that belong or do not belong to the legislature,
the procedures for adopting legislation, the function and meaning of legis-
lation, what constitutes a law of general application etc., but only a little
about what makes a legislator a real legislature.8
A real legislature is usually associated with the parliamentary legislator,
or at least a legislator that adopts rules that are generally binding on citi-
zens with the cooperation or approval of an assembly of elected people's
representatives. This democratically legitimized legislator must also be
superior to other legislators to prevent the rules that have been created
with the cooperation of the population's representatives from being imme-
diately cancelled by later or lower law-making bodies or simply set aside
by a court or administrative body.
Some of these elements are also found in the definition of "legislature"
- a fine one, as far as I am concerned - given by the English Internet
encyclopaedia Wikipedia:
7 Even the books that address this
issue in greater depth fail to answer
this question. See G.J. Veerman
(2008), Over wetgeving (On Legis-
lation). Sdu Uitgevers; The Hague.
Elzinga and De Lange do consider
this problem in the adaptation of
Van der Pot's handbook on Dutch
constitutional law, but they approach
this question in the light of the pow-
ers of the European legislator and
the norms to which it is bound
(including, for example, the principle
of legality - if any - in the EU). See
C.W. van der Pot (2006), Pot's
Handboek van het Nederlandse
staatsrecht (Handbook of Dutch
Constitutional Law), adapted by
D.J. Elzinga, R. de Lange, with the
cooperation of H.G. Hoogers. Four-
teenth edition. Kluwer; Deventer.
8 See W Voermans (2007), "The
Coming of Age of the European
Legislator", in Andreas Kinneging
(ed.), Rethinking Europe's Constitu-
tion. Wolf Legal Publishers;
Nijmegen, pp. 175-196.
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"A Legislature is a type of representative deliberative assembly with the POWer
to create, amend and ratify laws. The law created by a legislature is called
legislation or statutory law."9
It is this very people's representation aspect that distinguishes a real
legislator from other rule-makers that have - dependent or independent
- regulatory powers.
Popelier has also dealt with the exact meaning of the term "legislature".
She relies on the meaning of this concept in the First Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights. In this document, "legislature"
means the body that has its own primary regulatory power and must there-
fore be constituted on the basis of elections. lO For this reason, the principal
distinction between "primary legislation" (i.e. "Acts of Parliament") (the
product of the legislature) and "secondary" or "subordinate legislation"
(i.e. generally binding laws of inferior rank) lies in the democratic legitim-
acy of primary legislation.
"Primary legislation restricts, underlies and justifies other government actions,
which must always be based on legislation (or the Constitution). (... ) In other
words, the primary legislator requires no authorization other than the constitu-
tional provisions that confer general legislative power on it, whereas other law-
making bodies have only a conferred power in principle."11
Knowing the difference between primary legislation and secondary legis-
lation and between primary legislators and secondary legislators is one
thing, but this is not all there is to it. What are the characteristic features
of a real legislator? Let me try to list a few characteristics of real legislators.
I can think of the following:
9 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Legislature last visited 30 August
2008. By the way, this Wikipedia
page includes a nice list of the names
of all parliamentary legislators in the
world.
10 Patricia Popelier (2004), De wet
jttridisch bekeken (Legislation taken
from a legal perspective). Die Keure;
Brugge, p. 13 et seq.
11 Popelier (2004), p. 14.
1. Competence: a power conferred by a constitu-
tion or another constitutional document to adopt
legislation in the sense of generally binding rules.
2. Parliamentary involvement in adopting gener-
ally binding rules taking the form of "co-deter-
mination" (such as the right of legislative
initiative, the right of amendment, etc.).
3. Binding power: the power to bind CItIZens and bodies (for example,
administrative bodies, courts, etc.) through general legal rules.
4. Power of conferral of legislative power, meaning the power to create
law and delegate this power to other bodies.
5. Power of ratification: the power to approve or disapprove treaties and
the like.
6. Primacy: the power to exercise the highest law-making authority - within
the framework of a constitution - to which other bodies are subordinate.12
Lists are easy to draw up and never finished, but let us examine on the basis
of these provisional characteristics whether the new European legislator
as it emerges from the Treaty of Lisbon in fact qualifies as a real legislature.
3. THE EUROPEAN LEGISLATOR AFTER LISBON
On 9 July 2008, the Dutch Senate agreed to the Act approving the Treaty of
Lisbon, which marked the end of a turbulent period, which had seen a disturb-
ing declaration (the Laeken Declaration), a European convention, a rejected
proposal for a Constitution for Europe and then the Treaty of Lisbon. Most
of the Member States to date have -like the Netherlands - ratified the Lisbon
Treaty. Only the Czech Republic's and Ireland's ratification are still pending.
Although the consequences of the Irish "no" are not yet known, it looks
as if the Treaty of Lisbon will enter into force. Even though it was presented
as a step backward compared to the too ambitious constitutional treaty,
the institutional changes brought about by Lisbon are quite significant.13
12 In systems in which courts have the
right of constitutional review with
respect to Acts of Parliament (i.e. the
products of the legislator), too, a leg-
islator may still have primacy in law
creation, because in that case, the
court does not have any further law-
creating task - it does not create laws
itself - but it merely reviews laws and
can only prevent the entry into force
of proposed legislation and cannot
determine the contents of legislation.
This means that the court does not
create new, higher law, but it merely
applies it. Accordingly, the court does
not have its own or surrogate law-
making primacy.
13 The differences with the constitu-
tional treaty are negligible to a cer-
tain extent. The Treaty of Lisbon
does not include a number of things,
such as the symbols (flag, anthem,
public holiday) and the fundamental
rights, but apart from these, there are
only minor differences. The differ-
ences are small, so small even that
Dutch observer Antoine Jacobs
speaks of "Etikettenschwindel". See
A.T.M. Jacobs (2008), "Het Verdrag
van Lissabon en de Europese Grond-
wet; een overtuigend onderscheid?"
(The Lisbon Treaty and the Euro-
pean Constitution; a convincing
distinction?), Nederlands Juristen-
blad (Dutch Lawyers Journal), no.
6, pp. 320-329.
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This certainly applies to the legislative procedure and legal instruments of
the Union, which have already been discussed in the introduction. Until
recently, the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty did not provide for a uniform
legislative procedure. These treaties regulated the competences to adopt
directives, regulations and framework decisions - the Union's most impor-
tant "legislative'14 instruments - differently on a case-by-case basis. Some-
times the Council alone was competent to perform an act - on a proposal
from the Commission - and in other cases it was necessary to seek the
cooperation of the European Parliament, which could concern different
types of cooperation (consultation, cooperation, assent, codecision).
In some cases, the Commission was even independently competent under
the treaty.1S In addition, there were as many as 15 legal instruments. 16
Because of the combination of instruments and procedures, there were,
even if we disregard the comitology system.17 about 50 procedures.1s It is
impossible for European citizens to understand such Byzantine procedures.
This point had already been made in the analysis of the White Paper on
European Governance, published in 2001,19 and the conclusions attached
thereto in the Laeken Declaration.20 During the European Convention -
which carried out the preparatory work for a European Constitution in
2002 and 2003 - a special working group was set up to consider the possi-
bilities of simplifying and uniformizing legislative procedures and legislative
14 Because of the large number of
procedures and instruments under
the present treaties, there is not
really a fixed definition of "legisla-
tion", although the Court of Justice
does have a working definition for
"European legislation", usually used
to denote directives and regulations
that contain generally binding rules.
See also H. van Meerten (2001),
"Naar een nieuw Europees wetge-
vingsbegrip" (Towards a new defini-
tion of European Legislation),
Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees
recht (Dutch Journal for European
Law), no. 6, pp. 166-169.
15 For example, Article 96 of the EC
Treaty.
16 Of these instruments, 14 are spec-
ified in the treaties and one is sui
generzs.
17 The comitology system is
intended as a check on the rules the
European Commission may adopt
under a delegation of powers. In
adopting delegated or implementa-
tion rules (Article 202 of the EC
Treaty allows the conferral of pow-
ers for this purpose), the Commis-
sion seeks the assistance of
committees consisting of Member
State representatives. The proce-
dure is enshrined in the decision
from 1999, as amended in 2006. See
Council Decision of 17 July 2006
amending Decision 1999/468/EC
laying down the procedures for the
exercise of implementing powers
conferred on the Commission
(2006) 512 EC, OJ 2006 L 200/11.
By now, there are four types of
committees (depending on the pro-
cedure), to wit, advisory, regulatory
and management committees and
- the new - committees pursuant
to the regulatory procedure with
scrutiny.
1& See M. Jorna (2004), "Europese
wetgeving volgens de ontwerp
grondwet, of wat er verandert"
(European Legislation according to
the proposed European Constitu-
tional Treaty: what is changing), in
P. Koorn and L.B.M. Loeber, De
betekenis van de Europese Conven-
tie voor de wetgevingspraktijk (The
impact of the European Constitution
on Legislative Practice). Sdu Uit-
gevers; The Hague, pp. 18-20.
19 COM (2001) 428, OJ 2001, C 287.
20 Declaration of the European
Council of December 2001.
instruments.21 The working group made a number of specific recommen-
dations, including one general legislative procedure, drastic simplification
and uniformization of the legislative instruments under a new name, and
a form of hierarchy between these instruments. In 2003, these recommen-
dations were incorporated, with hardly any changes, into Part I and Part
III of the Constitutional Treaty. And the Treaty of Lisbon, too, incorpo-
rates these recommendations made by the Convention's working party
with hardly any changes. Only the new names for a regulation ("European
law") and directive ("European framework law") were not kept in the
Treaty of Lisbon - because of the alleged state-like associations. In order
to position the new EU legislator after Lisbon, I will briefly discuss the
changes in the legislative procedure and the instruments below.
3a. The uniform legislative procedure (ordinary legislative procedure)
of Article 294 of the TFEU
Preliminary Observations
The'Treaty of Lisbon amends the EC Treaty (also known as the Treaty of
Rome) and the EU Treaty (popularly called "the Maastricht Treaty"). For
this article I was already able to use a consolidated text of the Treaty of
Rome - which will from now on be called the Treaty on the functioning
of the European Union ("TFEU") - with the new numbering. This is really
helpful, but it may take some getting used to for some.
21 Working group IX of the Conven-
tion (the d'Amato Working Group
on Simplification) particularly looked
at the position of the "European leg-
islator". The aim of the group was to
create order, by means of simplifica-
tion, in the existing legal instruments
and corresponding procedures and
enhance the transparency of Euro-
pean decision-making as a result. The
Working Group's final report was
presented on 29 November 2002,
CONY 424/02, document no. 13 of the
Working Group. The Working
Group's views on the solutions were
relatively uniform and the debate in
connection with the Convention's
proposals on the simplification of
legal instruments and procedures was
relatively calm as well- except for the
issue of the QMV decision-making
rule. The question arises, however,
whether the working group chose a
sound method to enhance the trans-
parency and legitimacy of European
decision-making. The working group
appears to be a little naive when one
reads that it relies very much on a few
technical simplification and uniformi-
zation measures designed to improve
the legitimacy of the Union's deci-
sion-making. The working group fails
to address the substantive problems
such as the democratic deficit, the
absence of the right of legislative ini-
tiative for MEPs, and other substantive
issues. See WJ.M. Voermans (2005),
"Hoe verder met de Europese wet-
gever na het Nederlandse "no"?"
(The European Legislator after the
Dutch no-vote), in H.-M.T.D. ten
Napel & WJ.M. Voermans (ed.), De
betekenis van de Europese Grondwet
voor de Nederlandse staatsinstellingen
(The impact of the European Consti-
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One of the minor assets of the Treaty of Lisbon concerns the new arrange-
ment of the TFEU. Where in the EC and EU treaties, the legislative proce-
dures and instruments were scattered across the two treaties - and the
constitutional treaty also dealt with procedure and instruments separately
- the legislative procedure and the legislative instruments (entitled "legal
acts") are neatly grouped together in Chapter 2 "Legal Acts of the Union)
Adoption Procedures and Other Provisions" of Part Six of the Treaty.22
The ordinary legislative procedure
Article 294 of the TFEU is the central article from that Chapter 2 and pro-
vides for the new"ordinary" legislative procedure. This procedure, under
which the three legislative institutions of the Union - the European Com-
mission, the Council of Ministers23 and the European Parliament - can
adopt legislative and other measures together, is in fact a well-known pro-
cedure. It is the codecision procedure of Article 251 of the present EC
Treaty.24 This ordinary legislative procedure begins with an initiative of the
European Commission, which is exclusively competent to take this initia-
tive. The European Parliament does not have the right to initiate "legisla-
tion" .25 However, citizens - under the Citizens Initiative Procedure26
- or the European Parliament - through the legislation resolution - may
22 A small aside for those who are
interested in legislative drafting. The
style of the TFEU is - it has to be said
- abominable at the very least here
and there. In some places, the text
has become utterly unreadable as a
result of the large number of addi-
tions. For example, it looks as
though the text of Article 64(3) of
the TFEU was drafted in Brussels at a
very late hour of a night in June 2007
(it is impossible to ascertain its
meaning and there is no explanatory
note either). Articles 139(4) and
Article 209(1) and - for some reasons
- specific paragraphs of Article
238(2) and Article 244 - to mention
just a few examples - are also unclear
as a result of the language used. Par-
ticularly the French preference for
parenthetic clauses and the overuse
of the phrase "without prejudice to"
(also a French quirk) disfigure the
texts that are full of legalese anyway.
Often these are, of course, deliber-
ately vague and ambiguous (con-
structive ambiguity) to leave some
scope in the future. This happens to
be part and parcel of texts of this
kind. It looks as if the lawyers
employed by the Union disliked the
style of the text, too, because they
hit back hard. The structure of the
lengthy TFEU is exemplary. It is clear
that they have taken great pains to
perfect this. The Treaty now has a
logical classification of the subject
matter, diyided into parts, titles,
chapters and sections of the Treaty.
In the Netherlands we would reverse
the order of the titles and chapters,
but apart from that: nothing but
praIse.
23 Invariably called the "Upper
House" or the "Bundesrat of the
Union" by Ferguson (2004). That"s
an interesting one to think about.
24 At some point, the Convention
considered shortening the current
codecision procedure by one read-
ing, but because the codecision pro-
cedure is working well at present, it
was decided not to change it.
25 This means, according to Comb-
rez, that it is the only parliament in
the world without the right of legis-
lative initiative. We have to take his
word for it, because I have not been
able to check it. Christophe Comb-
rez (2003), "The Democratic Deficit
of the European Union; Much Ado
.about Nothing", European Union
Politics, vol. 4 (1): 101-120.
26 Article 11 (4) of the Treaty on
European Union. For such a request
to be admissible, at least one million
citizens from a significant number of
Member States should endorse an
initiative.
request the Commission to pursue an initiative. In actual fact, the Com-
mission cannot be forced to take any initiative, save a few exceptional cases
based on the old third pillar27, but it can be prevented from doing so.
Cooperating national parliaments can block a proposal through the orange-
card procedure.28
The codecision procedure regulates a complicated game that resembles the
French legislative procedure a little bit. It allows two bodies (Council and
Parliament) to exert influence on legislative proposals and fine-tune them
through several readings. The main idea behind the procedure is to allow
the European Parliament to play a genuine role in the European law-making
process. From the time of the Maastricht Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, the
scope of the codecision procedure has been extended in different periods
and now the "ordinary" legislative procedure is used for the adoption of
nearly all European legislation.29 As an exception, the Council itself adopts
legislative measures under an extraordinary legislative procedure, but in this
procedure, too, the decision cannot be adopted before the European Parlia-
ment's approval has been obtained, barring one exception: art. 92 TFEU.30
27 See Article 76, opening lines, and
under (b) of the TFEU (Rules for
administrative cooperation in the
context of the creation of the area of
freedom, security and justice).
28 This is enshrined in Article 69 of
the TFEU. This article refers to the
procedure that is included in the
subsidiarity and proportionality
protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon.
29 Since its introduction in 1992, the
codecision procedure has surpassed
many pessimistic expectations. In
2002 the Convention concluded that
the codecision procedure worked
pretty well. About 32% of the pro-
posals are accepted in the first reading;
in approx. 40% of the cases, the deci-
sion can be adopted after a second
reading 'and in 28% of the cases, a
Conciliation Committee is instituted
during the negotiations on the pro-
posal. See the Convention document
"Legislative procedures (including the
budgetary procedure): current situa-
tion", CONY 216/02,24 July 2002.
Even so, an interesting debate was
held on the question whether the
European Parliaments influence has
in fact increased as a result of the
codecision procedure. The American
political scientist George Tsebelis
claimed - two years after its intro-
duction - that as a result of the
codecision procedure, the European
Parliament's influence had declined
compared to the preceding period,
in which the Parliament was usually
involved in the legislative process
under the cooperation procedure.
In these first two years of the codeci-
sion procedure, he saw a shift in the
power to set the agenda towards the
Council. See George Tsebelis (1994),
"The Power of the European Parlia-
ment as a Conditional Agenda Set-
ter", American Political Science
Review 88, 1994, pp. 128-42. Later
on, he has had to adjust this picture
on the basis of the experiences in the
period after 1996. It turns out that
the Parliament has become more
important in relation to the Council
as a result of the codecision proce-
dure - also when it comes to setting
the agenda. See George Tsebelis and
Geoffrey Garrett (2000), "Legislative
Politics in the European Union",
European Union Politics 1(1),2000,
pp. 9-36. More recent studies show
that the influence exerted by the
European Parliament on legislation,
also in relation to the Commission,
has grown considerably. This is for
the most part due to the right of
amendment. Amie Kreppel (2002),
"Moving Beyond Procedure: An
Empirical Analysis of European Par-
liament Legislative Influence", Com-
parative Political Studies 35, 2002,
pp. 784-813.
30 The treaty has the following
exceptions to the ordinary legislative
procedure of Article 294 of the TFEU
(i.e. the special legislative procedures
of the TFEU). This concerns three
situations:
A. The Council decides after appro-
val of the European Parliament:
Article 19 (eradicating discrimina-
tion).
B. The Council decides after consul-
tation of the European Parliament:
Article 21(3) (social security and
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Under the ordinary legislative procedure of Article 294 of the TFEU, both
the Parliament and the Council have the right of amendment (even if it is
called "adopting a position" in the TFEU), and the European Parliament is
expected to exercise this right frequently and intensively.31 The procedure
provides for several readings, which means that it is possible to seek a
compromise with respect to a proposal through a kind of "navette" 32,
which may ultimately end in a third reading - after a Conciliation Com-
mittee has been instituted - even if the positions of the Council and the
European Parliament are far apart after two readings.
Does the ordinary legislative procedure give rise to a "primary" legislator
at EU level? This may seem a simple question, but it is in fact hard to answer
it. In any case, it does not give rise to a primary legislator in the Dutch
sense of the word, whereby a decision that has gone through the constitu-
tional legislative procedure (Art. 81 et seq. of the Dutch Constitution)
directly has - as an Act of Parliament - the status of "primary legislation"
(called: wet in formele zin). The ordinary legislative procedure from the
TFEU must be followed for quite different kinds of decisions and acts. N at-
urally, the Article 294 TFEU procedure is prescribed for nearly all directives
and regulations, but also the decision-making with respect t~ other instru-
ments quite often takes this route. Under the amended treaty, it frequently
happens that the Council and the European Parliament must follow the
ordinary legislative procedure for taking a measure - what the Dutch would
call a decision to perform an act or a financial decision.33 As a general rule,
social protection in connection with
the right to move and reside freely),
Article 22(2) (further regulations
concerning the right to vote and
stand in elections), Article 23 (secu-
ring protection by diplomatic autho-
rities), Article 25 (additional citizen
rights), Article 64 (restrictions on the
free movement of capital in connec-
tion with investments in third coun-
tries), Article 77(3) (rules concerning
checks on persons - passports, iden-
tity cards and residence permits),
Article 118 (uniform protection of
intellectual property rights, title pro-
tection, language arrangement con-
cerning the titles), Article 153(2)
(support of regulation concerning
work conditions in specific areas),
Article 194(3) (operation of the
energy market - tax measures).
C. The Council decides independen-
tly, without involvement of the
European Parliament: Article 92
(derogation from prohibition against
making more favourable provisions
for national carriers).
31 About a hundred proposed
amendments to a Commission pro-
posal during the committee stage of
a first reading is no exception. The
European Parliament has been very
active during the past three ses-
slOns.
32 This is the name of this shuttle
principle in the French legislative
procedure. It denotes a process
whereby the Assembtee nationale
and the Senat submit proposals and
amendments thereto to each other in
various readings until agreement is
reached on a text. The European
codecision procedure is based on this
French example.
33 This must be done, for example,
in the cases referred to in Articles 33,
48, 64(2), 77(2), 78(2), 79(2) and (4),
81 (2), 82, 84, 87, 114, 118, 133,
157(3), 166(4), 168(5), 169(3), 172,
173(3), 175, 182(5), 189(2), 194(2),
195(2), 196(2), 197(2),209,(2),212(2),
214(2), 325,(2), and 338(1) of the
TFEU.
the three legislative institutions are free to determine the legal form of
a measure. This may be a regulation, a directive, a recommendation,
or a decision to perform an act not intended to have any legal effect. Within
the limits set by the principle of proportionality, the institutions have free-
dom of choice in this respect. 34 In principle, the Dutch legislator - like
many kin-legislatures in the EU - does not have this freedom. In the
Netherlands the constitutional procedure also determines the form of
a decision to a great extent. If the route of Art. 81 et seq. of the Dutch
Constitution is taken, this necessarily means that the result will be called
a "statute" or (like in many other countries) an "Act of Parliament".
Another remarkable difference: the ordinary legislative procedure of Arti-
cle 294 by no means always results in a "legal act", which means a decision
by which a change is effected in the status quo of existing rights and
obligations. The ordinary legislative procedure may be used for adopting
a number of policy measures that do not change the law at all. For example,
non-binding opinions, recommendations (see section 3.b below), or policy
intentions must sometimes be adopted through the procedure of Article
294 of the TFEU. In the system of the TFEU, these opinions, recommendations
and policy measures are a type of legal act - even though they do not have
any direct legal consequence - namely a "legislative act" (Article 289(3) of
the TFEU). This is confusing"for legal scholars educated in the Netherlands.
This confusion is due to the fact that the TFEU uses a legal act concept that
is totally different from the one used in a lot of continental law systems
or in common law systems for that matter. And this brings us to the next
subsection.
3.b The legislative instruments of the Union: legislative acts and non-legislative acts
To exercise the Union's competences, the institutions may adopt regula-
tions, directives, decisions, recommendations or opinions in accordance
with Article 288 of the TFEU. Together, these :five instruments constitute
the "~egal acts" of the Union. This will take some getting used to, of course,
because in the Dutch legal literature - owing
much in this respect to German and Austrian 34 Article 5(4) of the ED Treaty.
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doctrine -, some of these instruments would not be called rechtshandelingen
(i.e. legal acts with legal consequence), For example, a recommendation or
an opinion cannot even be binding,35 In the Netherlands, we would be
more likely to call them "types of decisions".36
The directives, regulations, opinions and recommendations pursuant to
Article 288 of the TFEU are of the same nature as those in the current Arti-
cle 249 of the EC Treaty, In the Dutch text of the treaty, the term beschikking
from the old EC Treaty has been replaced by the term besluit, which is also
binding in its entirety. This use of "besluit", by the way, ends the problems
the Germans, Austrians and the Dutch had with "beschikking" under the
preceding text; it did not tie in well with their domestic administrative law
and administrative law doctrine. Observers from other legal cultures will
not be bothered much by these details. Both "beschikking" and "besluit"
translate as decision in English. Most countries do not distinguish between
types of decisions.
Aside from these details on the plane of the instruments there seems not
to be much new under the sun so far.37
Within the category of legal acts provided for by the TFEU, a distinction is
made between legislative acts and non-legislative acts. Legislative acts are
decisions adopted under the ordinary or special legislative procedure (Arti-
cle 289(3) of the TFEU) and non-legislative acts are decisions that are
adopted pursuant to delegation or for the pur-
pose of implementing a legislative act (Articles
35 See Article 288 of the TFEU, last 290 and 291 of the TFEU).
sentence.
36 Meaning that recommendations, It is important to point out that the difference
opinions, measures, etc. are always
adopted by decision, not that they between a legislative act and a non-legislative act
are also a "besluit" (usually trans- l'n the TFEU is of a formal nature. A delegated or
lated as "order" rather than "deci-
sion", because the latter is usually implementing regulation the Commission adopts
used as a translation of the narrower
term beschikking) within the mean- through delegation pursuant to a legislative act
ing of the Dutch General Adminis- d 11 f . h ' k
trative Law Act, of course. may an wi 0 ten contaIn w at IS nown as a
37 The Constitutional Treaty pro- material act of legislation, commonly referred to
posed to re-label the Regulation and
Directive into "EU Law" and "EU as statutory instrument, subordinated or second-
Framework Law". This Convention
proposal was undone by the Lisbon ary legislation, or - what we call in Dutch - "wet-
Treaty because it might - it was felt geving in materiele zin" (legal provisions of a
- prompt the idea of the EU as a
super, federal state. generally binding nature).
38 The above-mentioned Comitology
decision of 1999, as amended in
2006, had already removed some of
the lack of clarity as well. OJ 2006 L
200/11.
39 In the current consolidated Dutch
text, the term "niet-wezenlijke" is
improperly mentioned.
40 The doctrine of "Wesentlichkeit"
as a part of the principle "Vorbehalt
des Gesetzes". Expressed in the Ger-
man Constitutional Court Ruling,
BVerfGE 47, 46 (48f.).
41 "Exhaustive", as Jorna calls it.
(2004), p. 25.
The distinction between legislative acts and non-legislative acts is highly
important in the system of the TFEU, however. Non-legislative acts -
what an ugly term it is! - are subordinate to legislative acts. This hier-
archy between principal decisions and decisions that are adopted in
accordance with the comitology system, for example, did not exist under
the EC Treaty. Article 202 of the present EC Treaty provides only that
the Council may confer on the Commission powers for the implemen-
tation of the rules which the Council lays down. If the Commission
made these implementation rules, these had essentially the same legal
status as the basic decisions underlying the Commission's implementa-
tion powers. Indeed: these implementation rules prevailed over the basic
rules because they were more recent. This undesirable situation has now
come to an end and so has the relatively unclear status of comitology
and the role to be played by the European Parliament in terms of del-
egated and implementing decisions of the Commission: in short,
the non-legislative acts. 38
3.c Delegation and implementation under Lisbon: the future of comitology
The institutions that adopt legislative acts (the Council and European Parlia-
ment acting on a proposal from the Commission) may delegate the power
to supplement or amend (!) the relevant legislation in legislative acts of
general application (Article 290 of the TFEU). The primary legislator may
delegate such powers to adopt further rules only
for non-essentiaP9 elements. This norm - appar-
ently based on German law40 - has given rise to
some kind of primacy of the legislator at Euro-
pean level; the Union legislator regulates the
essential parts, whereas the Commission - through
delegation - regulates less important subjects.
Delegation possibilities are restricted by the TFEU.
The primary legislator has only two options - not
more41 - to interfere with the rules adopted by the
Commission pursuant to delegation, to wit:
42 See Article 290(2) of the TFEU.
43 The Member States themselves
invented and negotiated this check
on the drafting of implementation
rules in conjunction with the Com-
mission for the purpose of allowing
a somewhat more flexible delegation
practice.
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a) Revoking the delegation (also known as "call back");
b) A preliminary scrutiny option, which means that the delegated non-
legislative act may enter into force only if no objection has been
expressed by the Parliament or the Council within a specified
period.42
These delegation norms from the TFEU deserve support, because they
provide a transparent framework, which has been absent to date, for dele-
gating legislative powers to the Commission. This contributes to the
need of efficiency and decisive action, creates clarity, and treats the prin-
cipallegislative institutions on an equal footing. The question arises, how-
ever, what this will mean for the above-mentioned phenomenon of
comitology. Comitology may be described as "chaperoning" the Com-
mission with respect to its task to adopt rules through committees on
which Member State representatives sit. In 2004, Jorna pointed out - and
rightly so, in my opinion - that in principle, there should be the possibil-
ity of a contribution by committees consisting of Member State experts
who assist the Commission in adopting further rules pursuant to a delega-
tion' but that it is not in line with the delegation framework imposed by
the TFEU that these committees should be able to dictate, block or other-
wise control the contents of these rules, which is the case, more or less,
at present in the management, regulatory and scrutiny committees. In
various versions, expert representatives from the Member States assist the
Commission in such committees in thinking about and deciding on imple-
mentation rules about which the EC Treaty says that the Commission itself
must actually make these independently (Article 202 of the EC Treaty).
This kind of Member State"chaperoning" of rules that the Commission
may adopt pursuant to delegation is also inconsistent with the letter and
spirit of the new Article 290(2) of the TFEU. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, what developments the European political
nature will give rise to. Comitology was always
a Member State"check reflex"43, which did not
have any basis in the Treaty. The question is
whether this nature will adjust to the new treaty.
We will see what happens when the present
44 OJ 2006 L 200/11.
45 Article 290(3) of the TFEU.
46 See P. Eijlander and W. Voermans
(2000), Wetgevingsleer (Legislative
Drafting). Boom Juridische uit-
gevers; The Hague.
comitology decision from 1999 (amended in 2006)44 will be amended to
bring it into line with the TFEU.
Let me make a few closing remarks on the delegation procedure from
Article 290 of the TFEU. It is striking that the TFEU explicitly allows the
possibility that a non-legislative act adopted by the Commission pursuant
to delegation may amend the basic decision, the legislative act. A lower
instrument that amends a higher instrument or may even repeal it. This is
quite a shock to Dutch people, but in other EU Member States this occa-
sionally happens. In the United Kingdom, for example, this repeal possibil-
ity is called a "Henry VIII" clause. Incidentally, the question arises whether
Article 290 may also be used as a Henry VIII clause, i.e. the possibility
of repealing the basic instrument by means of a delegated instrument.
A second point: a non-legislative act that is adopted, pursuant to a delega-
tion, in a regulation (a legislative act), is, in terms of its legal nature,
a subordinate non-legislative act and is called a delegated regulation.
If a directive is the basic decision (the legislative act), the decision adopted
pursuant to a delegation would be called a delegated directive.45 We cannot
make it even simpler, but we can make it more complicated... Dutch peo-
ple may find it hard to get used to these counterintuitive terms.
3.d Implementing acts
Article 291 of the TFEU makes provision for implementing acts. This refers
to the collection of acts required for implementing European law - in the
broadest sense of the term.46 This includes the legal transposition of direc-
tives; the designation of administrative bodies; removing legal obstacles
that prevent the applicability of European law; in short, all legal measures
(because Article 291 of the TFEU is restricted to the latter) to be taken in
accordance with the duty of loyal cooperation. In principle, this is the
Member States" responsibility, but the Commis-
sion also has a role to play in this respect. In a
1989 ruling, the Court of Justice decided that
"implementation" comprises both the drafting of
implementing rules by the Commission (or the
47 CJEC case 16/88 Delegation judg-
mentJur. 1989, p. 3547.
48 Jorna (2004), p. 27.
49 Joma discussed the equivalent arti-
cle 1-37 from the constitutional
treaty.
50 Once again Jorna (2004), p. 27.
51 Named after the committee of the
same name. For the rapport of this
committee, see the Final Report of
the Committee of Wise Men (Lam-
faluss), Report) on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets, Brus-
sels, 15 February 2001.
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Council, in exceptional cases) and the implementation of these rules itself.47
Jorna believes that this ruling is also relevant to the provisions included in
Article 29148 of the TFEU.49 By all appearances, the Commission or the Coun-
cil will be able to draft implementing regulations under the VWEU as well,
even though this requires the express conferral of a competence for this
purpose in the basic instrument (the legislative act). This gives rise to a grey
area, because conferring an implementing power of a general nature consti-
tutes a delegation within the meaning of Article 290 of the TFEU as well. And
therefore, the delegation conditions apply too in that case. Or is this not so?
In any case, the Commission is not independently competent to draft imple-
menting regulations. Like Jorna, I believe that Article 290 of the TFEU is
nevertheless applicable.50 This appears to be an inevitable result of the system
opted for. Another deep one: the national legal measures the Member States
take are implementing acts within the meaning of Article 291 of the TFEU
and, consequently, non-legislative acts subordinate to legislative acts. An
interesting question that arises is the following: what will be the meaning of
legislative acts - such as directives - or amendments to these for legal meas-
ures that Member States have taken. Are the latter voidable as a result
of them, even within the transposition period? I believe so, even though this
is a rather drastic consequence of the system.
Lamfalussy
Article 291(2) also provides a basis for what is known as the Lamfalussy
method or procedure.51 In short, this method means that the European
Commission may seek the advice of experts and specialised committees
not necessarily composed of Member State rep-
resentatives in setting uniform implementing
standards (i.e. uniform implementing condi-
tions). As this procedure is not too democratic
in nature (experts who draft rules without direct
or indirect democratic legitimacy), Article 291(2)
of the TFEU instructs the Council and the Parlia-
ment, acting by means of a regulation, to lay
down general rules and principles relating to
the mechanism of control by Member States of
the Commission's exercise of implementing powers. This appeal for
comitology-new-style seems to suggest that comitology-old-style is no
longer in line with delegation under Article 290(2) of the TFEU, but that
its only function is to monitor the manner in which the Commission
exercises its implementing powers. Unfortunately, no clear distinction has
been made between delegation and implementation.
I would like to raise a final point: if a regulation confers implementing
powers on the Commission and the latter draws up implementing regula-
tions on the basis thereof, the product is called an implementing regulation.
By analogy, a directive will become an implementing directive. This will
take a little getting used to. The outline below may clarify things.
Outline of New Legislative Instruments
Legal instruments- old
(Article 249 of the EC Treaty)
et EC regulation =
• EC directive =
• EC decision =
Legal instruments - new
(Articles 288 through 292 of the TFEU)







2. EU recommendations and EU opinions
3. Implementing acts
- national measures
- implementing regulations, implementing directives,
etc'! with uniform implementing conditions,
prOVISIOns
4. THE MEMBER STATES AS CO-LEGISLATORS
The Member States constitute an integral part of the complex of bodies of
the European legislator under the new Lisbon structure as well. After
Lisbon, they have become a full legislative partner in two ways, as in the
52 On this subject, see also Voermans,
W.J.M. (2004), "De Nederlandse
wetgevei in de communautaire toe-
komst" (The Dutch legislature in the
European future), in P. Koorn & L.
H. Loeber (ed.), De betekenis van de
Europese conventie voor de wetgev-
ingspraktijk (The impact of the
European Constitution on Legisla-
tive Practice). The Hague: Sdu. pp.
53-106.
53 Voermans (2004), pp. 84-86.
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old system. They contribute to the preparation and adoption of European
legislation and they are responsible for perfecting European legislation
once adopted, for the European regulations and directives adopted in
Brussels and Strasbourg are often not finished at all: they must still be imple-
mented (and directives must often be transposed into nationallaw).52
These co-legislative duties are not to be taken lightly. Particularly its share
in the preparation of European legislation - and especially the national Par-
liament's share - gives cause for concern, for instance in the Netherlands,
but in other countries as well. We have found on several occasions that
Dutch parliamentarians are hardly aware of the fact that their Parliament
can make an important contribution to the preparation process and they do
not like the idea very much. The input the Houses may have in the prepara-
tion of European legislation requires thorough knowledge of the files,
a superb sense of timing and great commitment. In short, parliamentarians
have to put in a great deal of effort to achieve modest results. In the N ether-
lands these skills are not in big supply. There is not a big demand either. The
Dutch electorate is not in the least interested in the way parliamentarians
deal with proposals for European legislation. Once, I jokingly compared
great investments made by parliamentarians in European files to political
suicide.53 Efforts and return are - in the Netherlands, as in many other
Member State - fully out of balance, certainly given the fact that the Gov-
ernment has an iron grip on the European agenda and has much greater
expertise in this field. In addition, if you take into account that the European
meeting agendas do not take the slightest notice of meeting and planning
cycles in the Netherlands, or in any other Member State for that matter, this
results in parliamentarians often being poorly informed about the facts. This
forbidding climate of neglect, lacking information
and political disinterest, poor coordination and
scheduling has resulted in a an unfortunate down-
ward spiral in the Netherlands as far as its share
in the preparation of European legislation is con-
cerned. Of course, some will say that it does not
matter very much if the House of Representa-
tives" share in the preparation of legislation is
only nominal (the Dutch Senate is more active in
54 See W. Voermans (2007), "Invloed
van nationale parlementen op
Europese wetgeving: hoe doen de
buren dat?" (The influence of
National Parliaments on European
Legislation: How are our neighbours
doing that?), RegelMaat (Dutch
Journal for Legislative Studies), 4,
pp. 150-162.
55 See Giandomenico Majone (2005),
Dilemmas of European Integration.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
56 See L.J. Brinkhorst (2008),
"Europese Unie en nationale soev-
ereiniteit" (European Union and
National Sovereignty), oration deliv-
ered on 8 April 2008, Leiden Uni-
versity.
this field). The Government conducts negotiations and reports thereon to
the House of Representatives. Besides, the Senate compensates the omissions
of the House of Representatives to some extent, and then there is also the
European Parliament that keeps an eye on the process. In addition, the
House of Representatives is involved in the implementing process. I believe
that none of these arguments makes any sense. Unlike the House of Repre-
sentatives, the European Parliament and the Dutch Senate cannot provide
for direct national legitimacy of European decision-making. Formally, they
may have this power, but not substantively. These soothing arguments are
consistent with what I called "the logic of the international law approach to
European management of affairs" in 2007.54 This approach is still the standard
of all things in the Netherlands - the country I will stick to in this
paragraph. This approach means that the Dutch Government negotiates on
international matters on the basis of its own strength and presents the results
achieved to the Dutch Parliament. For a long time now, EU legislation has
not been comparable to other international matters, however, neither in
terms of its nature nor in terms of its sheer volume. The need for more
national control of European policy and European legislation, as evidenced
by the Dutch "no" in 2005, requires a parliamentary approach of European
management of affairs. Undoubtedly, this Dutch resistance is also related to
discontent about the process of "integration by stealth", as Majone calls this
process.55The national population feels it has hardly been involved in Euro-
pean decision-making, which is partly due to an outdated sovereignty
concept, according to Brinkhorst.56
To prevent the European decision-making process
from being even more "isolated" from the popula-
tion, it is possible to involve the national Parlia-
ment to a greater extent. The recent debate on
parliamentary involvement in EU matters is,
I think, both illustrative and recognizable. For
more than a decade commentators in the N ether-
lands have argued and rallied for closer parliamen-
tary involvement into Eu-dossiers in order to avoid
further EU alienation.57 The influential Dutch
Council of State, for one, has cherished this wish
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for a long time as well. Closer involvement may take various forms, the
Council observes, for example, closer cooperation between members of the
Dutch Parliament and Dutch representatives in the European Parliament.
Pursuant to this line of reasoning the Dutch Council rendered a positive
opinion on the participation of Euro MPs in debates in the Dutch House of
Representatives: the Council did not see any obstacles to it.58 Greater involve-
ment by the Dutch Parliament in the preparation of European legislation may
also be useful, the Council and a lot of Dutch commentators feel. By now,
many EU countries have given shape to this involvement through a "parlia-
mentary scrutiny reserve", which means that the government of a country
will not discuss a legislation file in the Council of Ministers until after it has
discussed this file in its own parliament.59 There is a great variety of reserves.
In some countries, this is even achieved by a written negotiation mandate for
the government. In the Netherlands we also had a kind of parliamentary
scrutiny reserve, the "right of consent" for files in the third pillar. As the
Treaty of Lisbon put an end to the pillar structure of the Union, the question
arose whether this right of consent should be retained. The commission
chaired by Meijers and Besselink, Curtin and Reestman advocated retaining
this right of consent.60 The Dutch Parliament, hovewever, did not seize this
opportunity: only a small part of the right of consent has been retained - on
the occasion of the enactment of the approval act61 - in a very restricted
number of specific fields where only the European Parliament should be
consulted - by way of exception to the ordinary European legislative
procedure. A proposal for a parliamentary scrutiny reserve has been adopted
only in a much diluted form. 62 This is a bad thing if one reflects on it.
57 N.Y. Del Grosso (2000), Parlement
en Europese integratie (Parliament
and European Integration), PhD-the-
sis RU Groningen, Deventer; Ph.
Kiiver (2006a), The National Parlia-
ments in the European Union - A
Critical View on EU Constitution-
Building, PhD-thesis Maastricht Uni-
versity. The Hague/London/New
York: Kluwer Law International.Ph.
Kiiver, ed., (2006) National and
Regional Parliaments in the European
Constitutional Order. Groningen:
Europa Law Publishing.
58 See the opinion by the Council
dated 19 July 2007, together with the
further report published in Dutch
Parliamentary Papers I1 2007/08,
31202, no. 4.
59 See W. Voermans (2007).
60 See L.F.M. Besselink, D.M. Curtin
& J.H. Reestman (2008), "Instem-
mingsvereiste en behandelingsvoor-
behoud voor Eu-besluiten!"
(Ratification requirement and scru-
tiny reserve for Eu-decisions), NIB
2008, pp. 1349-1350.
61 This approval act for the Treaty of
Lisbon was adopted on 9 July
2008.
62 Dutch Parliamentary Papers I
2007/08, 31 384 (R 1850), A. This
concerns, for example, the adoption
of rules for travel documents and
residence permits for Union citizens.
For a survey of the various amend-
ments, subamendments and motions
that have been submitted, see Dutch
Parliamentary Papers 11 2007/08,31
384 (R 1850) and for the votes ther-
eon, see Proceedings 11 2007/08, 93,
pp. 6619-6620.
63 For example, research shows time
and again that active involvement
(particularly parliamentary involve-
ment) in the preparation of EU direc-
tives is conducive to the speedy and
successful implementation thereof.
See B. Steunenberg & W. Voermans
(2005), The Transposition of Ee
Directives: A Comparative Study of
Instruments, Techniques and Proc-
esses in Six Member States. WODe,
Ministry of Justice; Leiden/The
Hague.
A final way of involving the national Parliament in the process is the
"orange card" procedure - a procedure that was negotiated by the Nether-
lands - at least is the way it is felt - in the run up to Lisbon. This procedure
is the"emergency brake" successor to the yellow card procedure from the
protocols to the constitutional treaty. This procedure means that if half of
the national parliaments do not agree to a proposal by the Commission
within an eight-week period, the European Commission must render
. a reasoned opinion if it wishes to maintain its proposal. If subsequently,
one of the co-legislators (Council with 55% of the members or the EP
with a majority of the votes cast) decides that the proposal is not consist-
ent with the principle of subsidiarity, the proposal will no longer be taken
into consideration.
The orange card procedure is an example of pure symbol politics, in my
view. Statistically, I believe that the chances of this procedure being suc-
cessfully used even only once over a longer period of time are negligible.
This is because pulling the orange card requires no less than a joint uprising
by at least 14 parliaments (including many bicameral parliaments). This is
almost impossible, because these rebellious parliaments do not have regular
consultation meetings, are also very diffuse, have very different cultures
and very little time to pull off a thing like that. And then I have not even
pinpointed the complicating factor that all these parliaments will probably
undermine the position taken by their governments at an earlier stage (the
Commission usually submits proposals only on request and with the
consent of the Member States), which might result in domestic political
fuss. No, although nothing is impossible, the orange card procedure simply
cannot work.
The Netherlands, as co-legislator, is also involved
in the implementation of EU legislation.
Of course, the preparation and implementation
of EU legislation are communicating vessels, even
though it concerns stages that should be distin-
guished.63 The Treaty of Lisbon does not intro-
duce many changes in the field of implementation
of EU legislation. Some comitology aspects might
or might not change following the entry into
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force of the Treaty. Accordingly, I will not deal with the involvement of
the Netherlands in the implementation of EU legislation any further.
5. REALLY?
It is time for the conclusion. Does Europe have a real legislature after the
Treaty of Lisbon? If we assess the new legislator from the TFEU in terms
of the criteria developed in section 2, the answer must be in the affirmative.
The Treaty of Lisbon replaces a motley collection of procedures and instru-
ments - which in some cases involved the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, but in other cases not - with one legislator (the Council and the
Parliament cooperating in a uniform legislative procedure on the Commis-
sion's proposal). Article 14 in conjunction with Article 16 of the EU Treaty
reveals the existence of one legislator in the Union. These provisions expressly
assign the legislative tasks in the Union to the Council and the European
Parliament jointly, enshrining the European Parliament's essential share
in the Union legislation in the Treaty. As a result of the operation of the
principle of conferral, the European legislature may not be competent to
draw up rules for every subject, but even so, the Treaty does confer substan-
tiallegislative powers on the Council and the Parliament in almost every field
of European policymaking. In the ordinary legislative procedure, the Coun-
cil cooperates with the people's representation and the European legislator
also has the power to adopt binding legislation. Regulations are binding in
their entirety and have direct effect in the Member States; directives bind
Member States as to the result and decisions bind those to whom they are
addressed. The European legislator has a power of conferral in the sense that
it may confer legislative and other powers on bodies (for example, Article
290(2) of the TFEU). In addition, in accordance with the procedure of Article
294 of the TFEU, the ordinary EU legislator has legislative primacy with respect
to "essential subjects", because Article 290(2) of the TFEU prohibits delegation
in respect of these subjects. And the ordinary EU legislator also satisfies the
final characteristic of a real legislator after the
Treaty of Lisbon: this legislator is competent to
64 This follows from Article 37 of the
EU Treaty. adopt legislation which binds the EU to treaties.64
Accordingly, the following conclusion should be drawn: we are dealing
with a real legislature. Now we should ensure that it will represent a real
power in the eyes of European citizens and will receive the public support
necessary for its decisions. This can be achieved only if National Parlia-
ment, like the Dutch Parliament, will utilize the possibilities of contrib-
uting to the preparation of European proposals for legislation; indeed,
if National Parliaments are seen to be taking their responsibility when
it comes to the deciding on the position that Member State takes in relation
to proposals for directives and regulations submitted by the Commission.
Scrutiny reserves can be wholesome in this respect because helps to ham-
mer home the message that European legislation begins in the Member
State itself, not in far off Brussels. It is important to know and propagate
this notion. This could for example help to relieve the process of Europa
Verfremdung65 as it is currently underway in the Netherlands and other
Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon itself will not improve the legitimacy
of European decisions. The institutions and politicians will have to do so.
Let see if political will and stamina will bring us there.
65 I.e. the process European aliena- siderable parts of the European Europan Union but merely subjected
tion rising from the feeling of con- public that they are not a part of to it.
